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What Constitution does Europe Need?
The House that Giscard Built: Constitutional Rooms
with a View
Paul Craig*
Any evaluation of the draft EU Constitution will be contentious.
Commentators will disagree as to general matters of constitutional
design, as to what are to be regarded as the ‘central’ features
of the Constitution, and they will disagree also as to whether
theÄ‘answers’ provided in the Constitution to any of the key issues
is satisfactory.
Let me state at the outset that I believe that judged in terms
of constitutional design the draft Constitution is a success.  The
decision to have one document, divided into four parts, the first
of which incorporates the constitutional principles1 that are to
govern the Union, is to be preferred to other suggestions for
distinct Treaties, or a Basic Treaty plus an ancillary Treaty.  The
Giscardian choice has a Gallic elegance, and is more accessible
than any of the rival constitutional designs.
Any choice of the central features of the Constitution will, as
stated, be contentious.  I believe however that the topics discussed
in this one hour lecture would appear on most such lists.  The
analysis which follows evaluates the draft Constitution from both
a horizontal and a vertical perspective.  The horizontal
perspective looks at the key features in the draft Constitution
that affect the way in which the Union institutions operate.  There
will be an analysis of the inter-institutional balance of power
between the European Council, the Council, the EP and the
Commission.  This will be followed by consideration of the
Constitutional provisions concerned with the Charter of Rights
and the Community Courts.  The vertical perspective considers
the provisions in the Constitution that affect the relationship
between the Member States and the Union.  The principal topics
discussed are competence, the primacy of Union law and the
Charter of Rights.
1. The Horizontal Perspective: Power, Control and
Accountability within the EU
(a) The Inter-Institutional Division of Power within the EU
The inter-institutional balance of power within the EU is central
to the new constitutional order.  It is central when viewed from
the perspective of legitimacy/democracy, and from the
perspective of efficacy.  It is not therefore surprising that this
topic, which is dealt with in Title IV of Part 1 of the Constitution,
has been so contentious.  This is reflected in the fact that this
‘room’ was empty in the original preliminary draft Constitution
published, and by the fact that discussion of the Union institutions
took place in plenary sessions of the Convention, not in working
groups as was the case with other topics.  The contentious nature
of this subject matter is further evidenced by the fact that the
content of Title IV is still subject to detailed debate, and
amendments are being considered to a greater extent than with
other parts of the draft Constitution.
It is important when reading the proposals to be aware of
certain fundamentals as to how the Union has operated thus
far.  Inter-institutional balance, as opposed to separation of
powers, has characterised the relationship de jure and de facto
between the major players: the European Council, the Council,
the European Parliament and the Commission.  The importance
of this balance has been stressed yet again in the documentation
to emerge from the Convention concerning Title IV.2
Legislative Power
This institutional balance is most readily apparent in relation to
the legislative process.  The Commission has the right of legislative
initiative.  The EP and the Council both partake in the
consideration of legislation and do so now on an increasingly
equal footing under the co-decision procedure of Article 251.
The draft Constitution has maintained the essentials of the
institutional balance that has characterised the legislative process.
The Commission has retained in general terms its gold standard,
the right of legislative initiative, Article I-25(2).  The EP and the
Council are said to jointly enact legislation, Articles I-19(1) and
I-22(1).  The co-decision procedure under which such legislation
is jointly enacted is now deemed to be the ordinary legislative
procedure for the making of European laws and framework laws,
Article I-33(1).  The reach of the co-decision procedure has been
extended to cover more areas than hitherto.  This treatment of
legislative power in the new draft Constitution is to be welcomed.
It is generally accepted that the co-decision procedure has
worked well.  It allows input from the EP, representing directly
the electorate, and from the Council, representing state interests.
Article 251 (now to be III-298) provides a framework for a
deliberative dialogue on the content of the legislation between
the EP, Council and Commission.  The extension of co-decision
to cover new areas is a natural development, building on what
has occurred in earlier Treaty reform.  It enhances the legitimacy
of Union legislation and its democratic credentials by enabling
the EP to have input into the making of legislation in these areas.
Executive Power: The Election of the Commission President
It should also be recognised that inter-institutional balance has
shaped executive power within the Union.  This power has not,
in the past, resided in a single institution.  It is exercised in part
by the Commission, which exercises a plethora of executive type
functions, including the administration of legislative programmes,
the planning of the legislative agenda, the negotiation of Treaties
with third parties, and the framing of the budget.  It would
however be quite mistaken to think of the Commission as the
sole repository of executive power within the existing
constitutional order.  The Council and the European Council also
wield executive power.  The European Council in particular is
especially important in this respect.  The Treaties may say
relatively little about the powers of the European Council.  The
reality is that nothing of major importance happens within the
EU without its approval.  It has a major say in setting the legislative
agenda, in setting the Union’s priorities, in deciding on the pace
and direction of change within the Union, whether this be in
relation to the timing of monetary union, or enlargement.
There have however been major debates within and outside
the Convention concerning the location of executive power in
the Union.  There are three dimensions to this debate that must
be disaggregated, even though they are linked: the election of
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the Commission President, the Presidency of the Union, and the
creation of an EU foreign minister.
Let us turn first to the election of the Commission President.
The Commission has in the past generally been opposed to the
idea that its President should be elected.  It feared the
politicisation that might result.  It has more recently changed its
view, and come to accept that some form of elected President
would enhance its legitimacy within the Union institutions, and
that it would thereby strengthen the claims of the Commission
President to be the President of the Union as a whole.  The
argument for electing the Commission President has also been
supported on democratic grounds, since the voters would then
be able, directly or indirectly, to ‘throw out’ incumbents of political
office that they disliked.  The debate then shifted as to who should
elect the Commission President.  Such an election could be direct,
taking place at the same time as elections to the EP, with voters
choosing the President by direct vote.  The election could be
indirect, the decision being taken by the EP.  There were also
considerable differences of view about the consequences of any
such change.  There are some who feel that direct or indirect
election would not markedly affect the modus operandi of the
Commission.  It would be very much business as usual, except
the Commission would have the added legitimacy that comes
from the election of its President.  There are others who accept
that election would significantly alter the character of the
Commission.  They acknowledge that election would lead to
politicisation, since a directly or indirectly elected President would
necessarily have a political platform or agenda.  They regard
such a development with equanimity in the following sense.  They
argue that the legislative and executive powers of the Commission
inevitably entail political choices, that they are not and cannot
be politically neutral, any more than can the exercise of the
analogous powers within domestic polities.  Better then for this
to be out in the open so that voters can directly or indirectly
make their considered choices.  The impact of electing the
Commission President has however not been fully thought through
even by those in this latter camp.  It is questionable whether the
Commission could continue to retain its near monopoly of
legislative initiative in such circumstances.  The EP has not
surprisingly been in favour of an indirectly elected Commission
President.  These options were premised on the assumption that
the Member States would be willing to accept a regime in which
they surrendered control over the Presidency of the Commission
to the EP.
The solution in the draft Constitution has brought a sharp
dose of political reality to the debate.  The Member States have,
unsurprisingly, not been willing to surrender this power.  The
articles on the institutions make interest reading in this respect.
Article I-19(1) states that the EP shall elect the President of the
Commission.  The retention of state power is however immediately
apparent in Article I-26(1).  The European Council, taking
account of the elections to the EP, puts forward to the EP the
European Council’s candidate for Presidency of the Commission.
This candidate shall then be elected by the EP.  If the candidate
does not get the requisite majority support, then the European
Council puts forward a new candidate.
The result, at least for the present, is that the Commission
President is indirectly-indirectly elected.  It is difficult to believe
that this will do much to enhance the legitimacy of the
Commission, insofar as this is felt to be a desired or necessary
objective.  Nor will it enhance the democratic credentials of the
Union, in the sense of allowing the voters to throw out those
whom they dislike, and install another person with a different
policy agenda.  The Commission President is however given
greater power over the choice of individual Commissioners than
hitherto, Article I-26(2).
Executive Power: The President(s) of the Union: A Milliner’s
Tale
The other major debate about executive power has been
concerned with the Presidency of the Union as a whole.  This
has at times bordered on the arcane, and much of the discussion
smacks of a milliner’s tale: the talk is of one hat, two hats, shared
hats and the like.  This should not mask the issues of real power
that are at stake.  Two main positions can be identified.
A prominent version of the single hat view was that there
should be one President for the Union as a whole, that the office
of President should be connected formally and substantively with
the locus of executive power within the Union, and that the
President of the Commission should hold this office and exercise
this power.  The Presidency of the European Council should
continue to rotate much as it has done in the past, on a six-
monthly basis.  The real ‘head’ of the Union would on this view
be the President of the Commission, whose legitimacy, so it was
hoped would be increased by the very fact that he or she had
been elected.
A prominent version of the double hat view is that there should
be a President of the Commission and a President of the European
Council, that executive power would be exercised by both.  It is
central to this view that the Presidency of the European Council
would be strengthened.  It would no longer rotate between states
on a six- monthly basis.  It was felt that this would not work
within an enlarged Union, and that greater continuity of policy
would be required.  This view was advocated by a number of
the larger states, but was opposed by some of the smaller states,
which felt that the Presidency of the European Council would be
dominated by the larger Member States.  The draft Constitution
reflects the second view.  Article I-21 stipulates that the European
Council shall elect a President for two and half years, renewable.
Thisn‘choice’ was pushed through by Giscard d’Estaing, and
the degree to which it had support from other members of the
Praesidium was debatable.  (issue about name: chair or
President).
Whether this ‘conclusion’ concerning executive power is what
we should want from the new constitutional order can be
assessed in terms of principle and practical politics.
In terms of principle, the contending arguments are as follows.
Those who are against the second view argue that there should
be one locus of executive power within the Union, by parity of
reasoning with domestic polities.  They argue further that the
divide in executive power will lead to confusion of responsibility
as between the President of the Commission and the President
of the European Council, and that this is even more likely to
occur because the nature of their respective executive
responsibilities is not clearly defined.  The argument the other
way is however forceful.  Executive power within the Union has
always been divided de facto between the Commission and the
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European Council.  This may not be neat, but it is how the Union
has worked for the last thirty years at least.  In terms of principle
there is on this view nothing wrong with executive power being
shared by a body representing state interests, and a body
representing the Community interest.  It is moreover clear that
for the last decade at least the Commission and the European
Council have worked symbiotically in developing the Union’s
agenda.
In terms of practical politics, how matters will work in practice,
we can also perceive two views.  There are some who accept
the inevitability of the double Presidency, recognising that the
larger Member States would not accept one President for the
Union, this post being held by the Commission President.  They
take the view however that this does not matter too much, since
the Commission President will, in practical terms, be the dominant
partner, by force of his legal powers, and by force of having the
Commission bureaucracy to support his initiatives.  They point in
support to the fact that while Giscard secured the extended
Presidency of the European Council within the Constitution, other
aspects of his proposals, for a vice President of the European
Council, plus a bureaucracy in support, hit the cutting room floor.
They imagine therefore a contest between a Commission
President and the President of the European Council in which
the latter does not have the institutional support to rival the former.
I do not believe this picture of how the two Presidencies will
interact.  The European Council has not hitherto had an
established institutional support mechanism to rival that of the
Commission, but this has not prevented it from exercising real
input into the pace and nature of the Union’s development.  It is
moreover reasonably predictable that the strengthened President
of the European Council will develop an institutional support
mechanism, whether this is written into the Constitution or not.
The recent proposals talk in terms of his drawing on the General
Secretariat of the Council for support.  It would nonetheless be
surprising if this did not blossom into a species of institutional
support suited to the specific needs of the—‘new’ European
Council.  The history of the Treaties thus far provides ample
examples of institutions which have developed, often outside
the strict letter of the Treaties, as a response to pressures or
concerns relating to institutional balance of power within the
Community as a whole.  The European Council itself began life
in this way, and COREPER and the Comitology committees are
further examples of the same phenomenon.
Executive Power: The Foreign Minister with the Shared Hat
The third main issue concerning the locus and nature of executive
power in the Union concerns the creation of the post of EU foreign
minister.  The post has been created by Article I-27: the Union’s
foreign minister is to conduct the Union’s common foreign and
security policy.  The idea that executive power within the Union
is divided between the European Council and the Commission
is personified in this post.  The foreign minister is to be appointed
by the European Council by qualified majority, with the
agreement of the Commission President.  Once appointed the
foreign minister operates as one of the Vice Presidents of the
Commission.
(c) The Charter of Rights
There has, as is well known, been much debate as to the legal
status of the Charter of Rights post the Treaty of Nice.  The draft
Constitution has made the Charter of Rights binding, Article I-7,
and the entirety of the Charter forms Part II of the Constitution.
This is to be welcomed.  If we are to have a Constitution then it
is right and proper for the Charter of Rights to form an integral
part of the constitutional document.  It should be binding and it
should be clear that it is binding.  The Constitution achieves these
objectives.  The way in which the Charter is brought into the
Constitution is moreover imaginative and to be applauded.  The
binding nature of the Charter is made clear in Article I-7(1).  It
would however have unbalanced Part I to incorporate the
Charter in its entirety into this part of the Constitution.  It would
also have been undesirable merely to append it as a Protocol.
The solution of making the Charter Part II of the Constitution
works well in terms of constitutional design, and the positioning
of the Charter text reflects its importance.  We should be equally
mindful of the consequences of taking this step.  There is no
doubt that rights-based claims against the legality of Union and
Member State action will increase, and that this will lead to the
further juridification of political life within the Union.  This is
especially so given the broad list of rights protected by the
Charter.  The amendment to the Charter, whereby a distinction
has been drawn between legally enforceable rights, and
principles that should guide legislative and executive action, but
not give rise to a direct cause of action per se, will have to be
worked out by the Community courts over time.  The ECJ and
High Court will also have to address the complexities surrounding
the relationship between the Charter rights and provisions of
the Constitution.  Article II-52(2) states that rights recognised by
the Charter for which provision is made in other parts of the
Constitution shall be exercised under the conditions and within
the limits defined by these relevant Parts.  The application of this
provision will be problematic.  This will be so even if Article II-
52(2) is altered as is being suggested to read that rights
recognised by the Charter that merely restate rights in other parts
of the Constitution will be exercised under the same conditions
and within the same limits.
The Constitution also stipulates that the Union shall seek
accession to the ECHR, Article I-7(2).  This may be desirable,
but the legal complexities should not be underestimated.
In procedural terms, applicants who seek to challenge Union
acts on the basis that they infringed Charter rights that are also
found in the ECHR will in most circumstances have to begin their
actions in national courts, seek a preliminary reference to the
ECJ, have their case heard by the ECJ, and then if they are
dissatisfied with the outcome, pursue their claim before the
ECtHR.
In substantive terms, Article II-52(3) provides that Charter
rights that correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR shall
be given the same scope and meaning as those in the ECHR.
This is subject to the caveat that Union law can provide more
extensive protection.3 This provision requires the identification
of those rights which correspond to those guaranteed by the
ECHR.  The task is facilitated by guidance from the drafting
process, and was addressed by an explanatory memorandum.4
The memorandum is not legally binding but it does constitute a
useful guide.  It concluded that the right to life, the prohibition of
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torture, the prohibition on slavery and forced labour, the right to
liberty and security, respect for private and family life, freedom
of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and
information, freedom of assembly and association, right to
property, protection in the event of removal, expulsion or
extradition, and the presumption of innocence and right of
defence, had the same meaning and scope as the corresponding
Articles of the ECHR.  It should nonetheless be recognised that
there are a number of Charter articles where the relationship
with the ECHR rights is more complex,5 albeit for different
reasons.  Some Charter rights, such Article 5 dealing with slavery
and forced labour, are based on an ECHR right in part, but go
beyond it, by expressly prohibiting trafficking in human beings.
Other rights, such as Article 8 dealing with personal data, are
based on more than one source, in this instance an EC Treaty
article plus directive, as well as an ECHR right.  Yet other Charter
rights modify the analogous ECHR right.  This is exemplified by
Article 9 of the Charter, which countenances the possibility of
marriage by those of the same sex, where this is permitted by
the relevant national law.  There are also instances where the
Charter article is based on more than one source, and modifies
the relevant ECHR right.  This is so for the right to education, and
for the important right to equality.  The other major injunction in
Article 52(3) is that the meaning and scope of Charter rights
that correspond to ECHR rights should be the same as those
laid down in the ECHR.  This may be problematic, where the
ECHR jurisprudence on the point is unclear, or where the point
is a novel one.
In conceptual terms, the fit between Article I-7(2) and I-7(3)
of the Constitution is also problematic.  The latter stipulates that
the fundamental rights contained in the ECHR shall constitute
general principles of Union law.  This conceptualisation of the
status of ECHR rights may be acceptable pending accession by
the Union to the ECHR.  The status and meaning of Article I-7(3)
if and when the Union accedes is more problematic.  It is clear
from the perspective of public international law that if the Union
accedes to the ECHR then it is bound by its treaty obligations.  It
may be that the intent is to create something equivalent to the
HRA position, whereby the ECHR case law is persuasive but not
binding on the Community courts even after the Union’s
accession.  This does not however follow from the wording of
Article I-7(3) as it is presently drafted.
(d) The Community Courts
The discussion of the Community courts by the Convention on
the Future of Europe can scarcely be regarded as satisfactory,
either in terms of process or outcome.
In terms of process, there was no working group established
to consider the implications of the draft Constitution for the role of
the Community courts.  A discussion circle was convened late in
the day to consider certain aspects of the Community judicial
system.  The time for discussion was however severely limited,
and similar limits applied in relation to the topics that were placed
on the agenda.  The provisions in the draft Constitution largely
repeat those to be found in the Nice Treaty, because there was
no time to consider more far-reaching changes that might have
been beneficial.  Thus the possibility of moving beyond the Nice
Treaty to a rational Community judicial system in which the CFI,
now to be known as the High Court, becomes a general first
instance court for all types of disputes, direct actions and
preliminary rulings irrespective of who brings the action, was never
discussed.  Nor was there any consideration given to the key
issue of whether we retain a referral system, or move towards a
more appellate regime.  These are matters of general principle
that should have been discussed within a body drafting a
Constitution for Europe, and this is so whatsoever one might think
the answers should be.
In terms of outcome, the conclusions reached by the Discussion
Circle and embodied in the draft Constitution on some of the topics
that were considered are contentious.  The possible modification
of Article 230 was one of the issues considered by the Discussion
Circle, which was split on the matter.6 One group felt that the
current formulation was in fact satisfactory and provided effective
judicial protection, taking account of the options for indirect
challenge under Article 234.  They felt that it was not necessary
to make any substantive changes to Article 230(4).  Another group
felt that the current wording of Article 230(4) was too restrictive
and a number of proposals were put forward to broaden standing
for non-privileged applicants.  Given the division of opinion, the
Chairman of the Circle, Antonio Vitorino, proposed a compromise
wording of Article 230(4), which has been taken up in to the
draft Constitution in Article III-266(4), ex 230(4): “Any natural or
legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings
against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and
individual concern to him, and against a regulatory act which is
of direct concern to him without entailing implementing measures”.
This left the basic approach in Article 230(4) unchanged, save
for situations where a regulatory act could affect the individual
without the need for implementing measures.  In such circumstances
there would then be standing provided that the applicant could
show direct concern.  The other provision which is of relevance in
this regard is Article I-28(1), the second sentence of which stipulates
that the Member States shall provide rights of appeal sufficient to
ensure effective legal protection in the field of Union law.  From
the perspective of the individual, these reforms do not touch the
deeper problems with the restrictive rules of standing for direct
actions addressed by Advocate General Jacobs in the UPA case.
These problems are exacerbated by the decision to make the
Charter binding: a regime of Community enshrined rights requires
an adequate system of remedies.  It will be scant comfort to those
who seek to enforce Charter rights against Union acts to be told
that even though they possess such substantive rights, they do not
have an interest sufficient to allow them to challenge the norm
directly, but will have to fight their way through at least one national
court before getting close to the ECJ.  It is in this sense
‘constitutionally asymmetrical’ to include a provision in Part One
of the Constitution, Article I-28, which exhorts the Member States
to provide sufficient legal protection in the field of Union law,
while saying nothing about any similar obligation on the Union
concerning access to justice.  The retention of the limits on direct
challenge is, somewhat paradoxically, equally problematic from
the perspective of the Community courts.  The problems of work-
load have been especially acute in relation to preliminary rulings.
By retaining the limits on direct challenge, and by forcing claimants
through indirect challenge, the ECJ is forced to hear challenges to
the validity of Community norms that should and could be heard
by the CFI, which would thereby alleviate the ECJ’s work-load.
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2. The Vertical Perspective: The Relationship
between Member States and the EU
(a) Competence: Clarity, Containment and Consideration
The Nature of the ‘Competence Problem’
It is clear that the issue of competence is central to the relationship
between the EU and the Member States in the new constitutional
order.  This was indeed one of the key issues specifically singled
out for further investigation after the Nice Treaty in 2000.
It is important at the outset to understand the ‘causes of the
competence problem’.  The EU has always had attributed
competence: it can only operate within the powers granted to it
by the Member States.  The EU’s power can be expanded by a
broad interpretation accorded to existing Treaty provisions, either
legislatively or judicially, by a teleological view of Article 308
(ex 235), or by the attribution of new competences to the EU
through successive amendments to the Treaties.  There is no doubt
that the existing range of EU competence is a result of all three
developments.  There are nonetheless differences of view as to
the relative importance of these factors.  For some the sphere of
EU competence has been expanded primarily through the broad
interpretation accorded to Treaty articles, both legislatively and
judicially, and through the broad interpretation of Article 308.
Others acknowledge the impact of the ECJ’s jurisprudence, but
place equal emphasis on the conscious decision by the Member
States to grant the EU competence in areas such as the
environment, culture, health, consumer protection, employment,
and vocational training.  I fall into this latter camp.  The idea
that the ‘competence problem’ is for example solely or principally
the result of judicial decision-making ignores the fact that very
important expansion in the areas over which the EU has
competence has been the result of a conscious decision by the
Member States.  These decisions were reached after extensive
discussion within Inter-Governmental Conferences.  The fact that
the EU wields a degree of competence in such areas can scarcely
be regarded as illegitimate given that the Member States
consciously consented to this grant of power.  It is therefore
mistaken to think about competence within the EU by means of
a direct analogy with the distribution of power in other federal
polities, where the divide is based on some general constitutional
provision, such as an inter-state commerce clause, with the courts
having the principal responsibility for determining the
ramifications of this clause for federal/state relations.
It is equally important to understand that any view concerning
the provisions on competences found in the new Draft Constitution
will necessarily be affected by perceptions as to what was, and
should be, the primary aim of the constitutional provisions in this
area.  We cannot judge the success or failure of the enterprise
without some understanding as to the objects being sought.  In
general terms, there were three principal forces driving this part
of the reform process: clarity, containment and consideration.
The desire for clarity reflected the sense that the Treaty provisions
on competences were unclear, jumbled and unprincipled.  The
desire for containment reflected the concern, voiced by the
German Lander as well as some Member States, that the EU
had too much power, and that it should be substantively limited.
This argument must nonetheless be kept in perspective.  We have
already seen that a significant factor in the present distribution
of competence has been the conscious decision of the Member
States to grant new spheres of competence to the EU.  This is
where the third factor comes into play, consideration of whether
the EU should continue to have the powers that it has been given
in the past, a re-thinking of the areas in which the EU should be
able to act.  The reality is that there has been little re-thinking of
the areas in which the EU should be able to act.  I say this not by
way of criticism, but by way of explication for the subsequent
discussion.  The Convention did not conduct any root and branch
re-consideration of the substantive heads of EU competence.
Nor would this realistically have been possible within the time
available.  The strategy was, in general terms, to take the existing
heads of competence as given.  The emphasis was on clarity
and containment.
The provisions on competence are contained in Title III of
Part I of the Draft Constitution.7 Article I-9(1) stipulates that Union
competences are based on conferral and that their exercise is
governed by subsidiarity and proportionality.  This is reinforced
by Article I-9(2), which provides that the Union must act within
the limits of the competences conferred on it by the Member
States, and that competences not conferred on the Union remain
with the Member States.  There then follow provisions on
subsidiarity, proportionality and primacy that will be considered
in detail below.  The categories of competence are set out in
Article I-11.  It is clear that the divide between these categories
has been the subject of intense debate within the Convention.
The ‘walls’ between the categories have shifted significantly and
continue to do so.
Exclusive Competence
The consequence of inclusion within the list of exclusive
competence is clear.  It is only the Union that can legislate and
adopt legally binding acts in such areas, the Member States
being able to do so only if so empowered by the Union or for
the implementation of acts adopted by the Union, Article I-11(1).
The domain of exclusive competence comes out reasonably
in terms of clarity.  The areas deemed to fall within exclusive
competence are competition rules within the internal market,
monetary policy for the Member States that have adopted the
Euro, common commercial policy, customs union, and the
conservation of marine biological resources under the common
fisheries policy, Article I-12(1).  There may of course be
borderline issues as to whether action falls within one of these
areas, as opposed to the that of shared competence.  Borderline
disputes of this nature are inevitable whenever lines are drawn.
The categories that comprise exclusive competence are however
relatively discrete, and borderline disputes should not be too
difficult to resolve.
The domain of exclusive competence also fares pretty well
when judged by the desire for containment.  The consequences
of inclusion within this category are severe: the Member States
have no autonomous legislative competence.  A broad reading
of exclusive competence would therefore have had the opposite
effect of containment, since it would enhance the power of the
centre at the expense of the Member States.  The importance of
this point is readily apparent by considering earlier formulations
of this category.  The main change from the earlier formulation
is the removal of the four freedoms from the sphere of exclusive
competence, and their re-assignment to the category of shared
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competence.  The reason given for this change is that there is
now a specific provision dealing directly with the four freedoms,
Article I-4, which is said to make their legal and political
importance more visible than hitherto, and to underline the fact
that they are directly applicable.  While it might be felt to be
desirable to for political reasons to emphasise the centrality of
the four freedoms, the argument based on direct applicability is
odd to say the least, given that many other Treaty provisions
have this quality.  The real reason for the excision of the four
freedoms from Article I-12 may have been rather different.  If
they had remained within the category of exclusive competence,
Member States would have had no legislative capacity in these
areas.  Taken literally, this would have meant that a Member
State would have been precluded from enacting legislation that,
for example, liberalised trade in postal services, unless it had
first secured the agreement of the Union.  Thus, Member State
action which was ‘ahead’ of EU action would have been
precluded even though it may have been in accord with the
overall aims of the EU, and even though it may well have been
the catalyst for EU action in such areas.8
Shared Competence
The basic provision on shared competence is found in Article I-
11(2).  When a competence is shared then the EU and the
Member States have power to legislate and adopt legally
binding acts within that area.  However the Article also provides
that the Member States shall exercise their competence to the
extent that the Union has not exercised or has decided to cease
exercising its competence.  The provisions in this area can be
assessed in terms of the twin aims of clarity and containment.
Let us consider clarity first.  It is now clear that shared
competence is the default position.  This is readily apparent from
Article I-13(1), which provides that where the Constitution confers
a competence that is neither exclusive nor supporting it shall be
regarded as being a shared competence.  The detailed list of
areas set out in Article I-13(4), are then merely examples of the
principal areas where shared competence operates.  This does
provide some degree of clarity, albeit to a limited degree.  It
should nonetheless be recognised that the way in which power
is shared in the diverse areas covered by the general category
of shared power differs significantly.  The precise configuration
of power sharing in areas such as the internal market, consumer
protection, energy, social policy, the environment, and the like
can only be determined by considering the detailed rules that
govern these areas, which are found in Part III of the Constitution.
There is nothing in the discussion of the Title on competences
that will help the interested onlooker to work this out.  There, is
in other words, subject to what will be said below, no magic
formula that applies to all areas of shared power that determines
the precise delineation of power in any specific area.  This is not
a criticism as such.  It is rather the consequence of the fact that
the EU has been attributed competence in different areas through
successive Treaty amendments, coupled with the fact that the
precise degree of power it has been accorded will differ as
between these areas.  The direct consequence is that the regime
of shared power, the amount of power wielded by the EU, and
that left to the Member States, will be different in these diverse
spheres.  This is recognised in Article I-11(6), which states that
the scope and arrangements for exercising the Union’s
competences shall be determined by the provisions specific to
each area in Part III of the Constitution.
 Let us now consider containment, the other objective
underlying the provisions on competence.  Article I-9(1) and (2)
provide the basic touchstone that the EU only has competence
in the areas conferred on it, and that any other competence
remains with the Member States.  This foundational provision
must however be seen in the light of the more detailed provisions
that come thereafter.  In the context of shared power, which is
as we have seen the default position, the Member State can
only exercise power in areas of shared competence to the extent
that the Union has not exercised or has decided to cease to
exercise its competence within these areas, Article I-11(2).  Taken
literally this looks like automatic pre-emption of Member State
action where the Union has exercised its power.  The
consequence is that the amount of shared power held by the
Member State in these areas would diminish over time.  Power
sharing would on this view be a one way bet, subject to the
remote possibility that the EU decides not to exercise its
competence within a specific area.  If containment is the prime
objective, then there is little here to give comfort to supporters of
states’ rights.  This conclusion as to the import of Article I-11(2)
is however misleading in two respects.  Member States will only
lose their competence within the regime of shared power to the
extent that the Union has exercised its competence.  Precisely
what the EU’s competence actually is within these areas can
only be divined by considering the detailed provisions that divide
power in areas as diverse as social policy, energy, the internal
market and consumer protection.  Moreover, it would be wrong
to conclude that the Member States lose their competence even
where the EU has exercised its competence, notwithstanding
the wording of Article I-11(2).  EU legislation may entail complete
harmonization, but it may also be framed so as to constitute
minimum harmonization, with the specific intent of leaving
Member States with room for action in the relevant area.  There
is nothing in the new Constitution to suggest that this latter option
should not be open.  To the contrary, the thrust of many of the
constitutional provisions is to ensure that the EU does not legislate
where action is better taken at national level.  The upshot is that
the real limits on Union competence must be found in the detailed
provisions in Part III which delineate just what the EU can do in
the diverse areas where power is shared.  It is these provisions,
and the way in which the EU decides to legislate within these
areas, that will determine the reality of the divide between state
power and EU power.  This is of course what we have always
had to do in order to determine the boundaries between state
and EU power.
Areas of Supporting, Co-ordinating or Complementary Action
The third principal category of competence is set out in Article I-
11(5).  This stipulates that in certain areas and in the conditions
laid down in the Constitution, the Union shall have the
competence to carry out actions to support, support or co-
ordinate the actions of the Member States, without thereby
superseding their competence in these areas.  Article I-16
specifies the areas where the EU has this type of power.  They
are: industry; protection and improvement of health; education,
vocational training, youth and sport; culture; and civil protection.
There can be little doubt that judged in terms of clarity this
category of competence will prove to be problematic.  The list
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of areas in Article I-16 may well be clear, but the problem resides
in the potential for overlap and boundary problems between
this category and that of shared power.  This is acknowledged
in the Praesidium’s comment, where it is accepted that regulation
of the media may come under the internal market, which is shared
power, and culture.9 Certain aspects of public health come within
shared power, others within the category of supporting action.
This category of EU competence is also problematic when
viewed from the perspective of containment.  This comes to the
fore in the tension between Article I-11(5) and Article I-16(4).
The former is framed in terms of EU action not ‘superseding’
Member State competence in these areas.  The latter provides
that legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of
the provisions specific to these areas cannot entail harmonization
of Member States’ laws.  While it is clear that the EU cannot
harmonize the law in these areas, it is equally clear that it can
pass legally binding acts, the scope of which will, in accord
with Article I-11(6), be determined by the provisions specific to
each of these areas.  Where the EU does enact such legally
binding acts they will bind the Member States.  The competence
of the Member States will be superseded within the area covered
by the legally binding act, although the latter may of course
allow the states some choice/discretion, depending on the type
of law enacted.
The Co-ordination of Economic, Employment and Social Policy
The categories of competence discussed thus far have a certain
symmetry.  A division between exclusive, shared and supporting
competence can be understood, notwithstanding the difficulties
mentioned above.  The existence of a specific head of
competence dealing with common foreign and security policy
is also readily explicable, given the distinct rules that apply in
this area.  The creation of a particular head of competence in
Article I-11(3) to deal with economic and employment policy is
more problematic.  Article I-14 spells out this category of EU
power in greater detail.  Article I-14(1) states that the Union
shall adopt measures to ensure the co-ordination of the economic
policies of the Member States, in particular by adopting broad
guidelines for these policies.  The Member States must co-
ordinate their economic policies within the Union.  Article I-14(2)
provides that specific provisions shall apply to those member
States that have adopted the Euro.  Employment policy is dealt
with in Article I-14(3), which states that the Union shall adopt
measures to ensure the co-ordination of Member State
employment policies, in particular by adopting guidelines for
these policies.  It is further provided in Article I-14(4) that the
Union may adopt initiatives to ensure co-ordination of Member
State social policies.
The very existence of this category has proven to be
controversial, with some members of the Convention calling for
these areas to come within shared competence, while others
argued for the inclusion of employment as well as economic
policy within this separate category.  The Praesidium felt that
this should be retained as a distinct category because the specific
nature of co-ordination of economic and employment policy
merited separate treatment.10 This somewhat Delphic utterance
provides little by way of reasoned explanation.  The real
explanation as to why it was felt desirable to single out these
areas for separate treatment within the regime of Union
competence was political.  There would have been significant
opposition to their inclusion within the head of shared
competence.  The very depiction of economic policy as an area
of shared competence with the consequence of pre-emption of
state action would have been potentially explosive in some
quarters at least.  It is equally clear that there were those who
felt that the category of supporting, co-ordinating and
complementary action was too weak.  Hence the creation of
the separate category, and hence its placing after shared power,
but before the category of supporting, co-ordinating and
complementary action.
This may well have been the rationale for the creation of this
category, but it does little to enhance the sense of clarity in the
regime of competences overall.  This is in part because, by way
of contrast to the other heads of competence, Article I-11 does
not specify any general consequences for the divide between
state power and EU power for this category.  It is in part because
of the overlap between Article I-14 and the category of shared
power dealt with in Article I-13.  Thus, for example, certain
aspects of social policy are regarded as coming within shared
power, while others fall within the category dealing with
economic, employment and social policy.
(b) The Primacy of EU law
The primacy of EU law over national law has not hitherto been
enshrined as part of the Treaties.  The supremacy doctrine has,
as is well known, been developed by the ECJ, and has met with
a mixed reception from Member States’ courts.  The draft
Constitution has now bitten this particular constitutional bullet:
Article I-10(1) provides that the Constitution and law adopted
by the Union’s institutions in exercising competences conferred
on it, shall have primacy over the law of the Member States.
This is reinforced by Article I-10(2), which stipulates that Member
States shall take all appropriate measures, general or particular,
to ensure fulfilment of the obligations flowing from the Constitution
or resulting from the Union Institutions’ acts.  So does this signal
the death of one of the staple topics in EU law courses?  Does it
close the chapter on this part of EU scholarship?  Not quite, for
the following reasons.
Firstly, the phrase “shall have primacy over the law of the
Member States” is ambiguous.  This could be interpreted to
mean, following the jurisprudence of the ECJ, that supremacy
operates over all national law, including provisions in a national
constitution.  It could alternatively be read so as to accord
primacy to EU law over national law, primary and secondary
legislation, but not the national constitution itself.
Secondly, it remains to be seen whether the constitutional
courts of the Member States will regard such a provision as
acceptable from the perspectives of their own national
constitutions.  The idea that a Union regulatory act, in effect
secondary legislation, should be deemed to have primacy over
the law of the Member States might not be readily accepted by
some constitutional courts, more especially so if this is taken to
include primacy over national constitutional norms as well as
national legislation.  They might rule that their national
constitutions do not allow ratification of a Constitution in such
terms.
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Thirdly, insofar as Article I-10(1) confers supremacy on Union
law the conceptual foundation will almost certainly be treated
by Member State courts as continuing to flow from their own
constitutional provisions rather than the more communautaire
reasoning of the ECJ.  Supremacy of Union law will be held to
exist because the Member States have agreed to this by their
ratification of the Constitution.  It will not necessarily be treated
as inherent in the Community order.
Fourthly, Article I-10(1) only accords primacy to Union law
“in exercising competences conferred on it”.  There is nothing
within this wording that resolves in and of itself, the issue of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz: who is to decide on the ultimate
boundary of Union competences, the ECJ or the Member State
courts.  Nor is there anything in Article I-28 that resolves this
issue.  The wording of Article I-9, which emphasises the principle
of conferral/attribution, does nothing to bolster the claims of
the Union to decide on the ultimate boundaries of competence.
The issue as to the boundaries of Union competence can arise,
as we have seen in Brunner, either as a result of judicial action
or as a result of legislative action.  Thus an individual might argue
before a national court that action is beyond the EU’s
competence because the ECJ has accorded an interpretation to
certain articles of the Constitution that they cannot properly bear.
An individual might in a similar vein contend that the Union
legislature has enacted acts that go beyond those that could be
based on the particular article in question.  The very fact that
Union competences have been divided in the manner considered
above renders this type of challenge more likely than before.
This is especially so in relation to the divide between shared
competence, and competence that only allows supporting and
co-ordinating action by the Union, or in relation to the divide
between shared competence and the competence over
economic and employment policy.  We have already seen that
the boundary lines between these heads of competence can be
difficult to discern in relation to certain types of subject matter.  It
is also open to question whether Charter rights should be
regarded in conceptual terms as conditioning the exercise of
Union competence.  The argument in favour of this interpretation
is that the Charter is binding, with the consequence that Union
acts, even if prima facie made in relation to an area over which
the Union has conferred competence, will not be valid if they
violate Charter rights.
Fifthly, there is a nice point as to whether subsidiarity and
proportionality serve to define the boundaries of Union
competence.  We should recall here that Article I-10(1) accords
primacy to Union law in “exercising competences conferred on
it”.  There is clearly a distinction between the limits of competence,
and the use of competence that has prima facie been accorded
to the Union.  This dichotomy comes over in Article I-9(1), which
stipulates that subsidiarity and proportionality are to govern the
use of Union competence.  Article I-10(1) clearly serves to
condition the primacy of Union law by insisting that it be made
within the limits assigned to the Union, such that law can only
be made within one of the designated areas, energy, consumer
protection and the like.  The issue is whether the word exercising
within Article I-10(1) also conditions the primacy of Union law
in relation to the way in which conferred powers are used, with
the consequence that if subsidiarity and proportionality are not
complied with the resulting Union law does not have primacy
over Member State law.
Finally, a word should be said more specifically about the
effect of Article I-10 from the perspective of UK constitutional
law.  The answer in brief is as follows.  A Union Constitution,
duly ratified by an Act of Parliament, which includes this Article
would be accepted by the courts.  They would almost certainly
reason as they have done in the past, that the Act of Parliament
ratifying the Constitution should be regarded as an exercise of
sovereignty by the existing Parliament.  The key issue would then
be the effect of later UK legislation, which was inconsistent with
a Union act.  The UK courts have already acknowledged that
the doctrine of implied repeal, whereby an inconsistency
between an earlier and a later norm is resolved in favour of the
latter, will not apply in relation to a clash between Union law
and domestic law.  The existence of Article I-10(1) would
reinforce this position.  The courts would therefore construe UK
legislation so as to be compatible with Union law, and hence
compatible with Article I-10(1).  The problematic case would
arise if Parliament stated expressly and unequivocally that it was
derogating from a specific Union act, while remaining in the
Union.  The courts would then be faced with a choice.  They
could say that in such circumstances the latest will of Parliament
has to take priority, even if this entails a breach of Union law.
They could alternatively say that in the light of inter alia Article I-
10(1) it is not open to a UK Parliament to derogate from a
particular Union act while remaining within the Union.
(c) The Charter of Rights
It is clear that the Charter of Rights has implications for the
Member States as well as the EU.  Article II-51(1) defines the
scope of application of the Charter.  It is addressed to the
institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union with due regard
to the principle of subsidiarity, and to Member States only when
they are implementing Union law.
In substantive terms, while there has been debate about the
precise meaning of the word ‘implementing’ the ECJ will in all
probability decide that this covers the same sphere of state action
as its previous jurisprudence under the fundamental rights
doctrine.  This covers cases such as Wachauf, where the Member
State acts as agent for the implementation of a Community norm.
It covers also cases such as ERT, where the ability of the Member
State to use the exceptions to, for example the rules on free
movement, is judged for compliance with EU fundamental rights.
The binding nature of the Charter on Member State action would
also operate when Member States are implementing a
framework law, or what used to be known as a directive.  It
should also be recognised that in the cases that do fall within
the sphere of implementation, the national courts will have to
adjudicate on a much broader range of rights than those currently
found in the HRA.  The legality of Member State action in such
cases may be tested for compliance with some social and
economic rights, as well as the more traditional civil and political
rights.
In procedural or jurisdictional terms, adjudication on rights-
based claims against the state will become more complex.  This is
in part because claimants will be able to get at ECHR rights either
through the HRA or, in cases where there is implementation of
Union law, through the Charter rights included in the Constitution.
There may moreover be incentives to use the latter route, since
Convention rights mediated through Union law may provide a
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more potent weapon than the HRA.  This is particularly so where
the incompatibility with ECHR rights flows from primary legislation.
In such instances the courts are limited to making a declaration of
incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA.  However, the
supremacy law of Union law applies in relation primary legislation
itself.  The Member States’ breach of Union law may consist of
failure to comply with the Community Charter of Rights.  The
national courts could then declare that the primary legislation
was actually inapplicable to the instant case, rather than simply
making a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the
HRA.  The procedural or jurisdictional complexity may also arise
because of the different force accorded to ECHR rights under the
HRA and the Charter.  Under the HRA national courts have an
obligation to take account of the Strasbourg case law.  They are
not bound to follow it.  The national courts are bound to apply
Union law, and the EU has committed itself to giving the same
interpretation to those Charter rights that are also in the ECHR.
Article II-53 is also of direct relevance for Member States.  It
is entitled ‘Level of Protection’.  It provides that nothing in the
Charter is to be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting
human rights recognised, in their respective fields of application,
by Union law and international law and by international
agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the
Member States are party, including the ECHR, and by the
Member States’ constitutions.  The aim of this provision was said
to be to maintain the level of protection ‘currently afforded within
their respective scope by Union law, national law and
international law’.11 There are two difficulties in relation to Article
II-53 as it applies to Member States.
There is, on the one hand, an ambiguity as to the import of the
phrase ‘in their respective spheres of application’.  It appears to
mean that nothing in the Charter should be interpreted as restricting
etc human rights recognised in the respective areas to which public
international law, international agreements and Member State
constitutions apply.  It therefore delineates the spheres of
application of human rights norms derived from these other areas.
This is problematic in relation to human rights recognised in
Member State constitutions.  The jurisprudence from German and
Italian courts is not premised on the assumption that their human
rights norms only apply within a limited field, being that to which
Community rules do not apply.  It is premised rather on the
assumption that such national constitutional protection continues
to be generally applicable, but that national courts might choose
not to exercise their jurisdiction if satisfied that the protection of
rights within the Community legal order is (generally) sufficient.
There is, on the other hand, the problem that Article II-53 is
framed in terms of Member States’ constitutions, in the plural.  It
is clear that the list of constitutional rights contained in national
constitutions is not identical.  It is equally clear that the particular
conception or meaning accorded to the same right varies as
between states.  This creates an obvious difficulty for the ECJ
faced with the application of Article II-53.  The interpretation of
a Charter right might adversely affect human rights as protected
within the constitution of one Member State but not another.
The difficulty would be exacerbated if it was a zero sum game,
such that the interpretation of the Charter right to accord with
one Member State constitution necessarily was adverse to the
interpretation of the same right in other national constitutions.
The injunction in Article II-52(4), that Charter rights that result
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States
shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions, might
alleviate the problem, but will not necessarily resolve it.
It might be argued that this is a false problem, since the only
national constitution that should ever be relevant is that of the
state from which the facts of the case emanate.  This will not
withstand examination.  The meaning given to the Charter right
might originate in the context of a case concerning the validity of
a generally applicable Community regulation, where the particular
state that refers the matter is fortuitous.  Moreover, the interpretation
given to a Charter right in a case which occurs in, for example,
Spain could have very real implications for other countries.
The difficulty could nonetheless be resolved in some cases
by applying a margin of appreciation.  Where Charter rights
apply to Member State action in accord with Article II-51, it
might be legitimate to tailor the interpretation of the right to that
particular Member State through the margin of appreciation,
thereby obviating any clash with that national constitution.  In
other cases, this will not however be possible.  The construction
of a Charter right might arise in a case concerning Member
State implementation of EC law, where, as in ERT or Familiapress,
another Member State’s laws are directly implicated in the action.
It is perfectly possible for an interpretation of the Charter right
to affect adversely the constitutional right protected by one
Member State, while the contrary construction would be
regarded as constitutionally objectionable by the other state.  In
these circumstances the ECJ will necessarily have to make difficult
choices.  Working Group II of the Laeken Convention proposed
an amendment to the Charter, to the effect that insofar as the
Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the
constitutional traditions of the Member States, the rights shall be
interpreted in harmony with those traditions.12 This will not
however in and of itself resolve the tensions considered above.
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